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A PARADIGM SHIFT
Barnett, Roger W. Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power. Brassey’s, 2003. 176pp. $39.95

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
cacophony of voices arose (mostly from
the conservative wing of the Republican
Party) asserting that the United States was
in danger of being eclipsed by the Soviet
Union. In short, the argument was “the
sky is falling.” President Reagan used the
issue to great advantage during the
1980 presidential campaign, setting
the stage for a massive increase in defense expenditures and the launching
of the ambitious “Star Wars” program, the forerunner of the Clinton and
Bush administrations’ attempt to build
a national missile defense system. It
turned out that Soviet power had been
exaggerated and that our own political,
intellectual, and ideological predispositions had blinded us to signs of the impending implosion of the Soviet system.
Interestingly, it could be argued that
however misguided the Reagan defense
buildup might have been vis-à-vis its
principal objective, programs launched
during that era set us on the path that
today has resulted in an unprecedented
global conventional military superiority
that we see manifested today in battlefields around the world.
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Today, there are new arguments that
the sky is falling, that the global security
environment has undergone profound
and even revolutionary change, and
that the United States remains woefully
unprepared to deal with the threats
posed by a new caste of diabolical adversaries boasting new and dangerous
capabilities. Roger Barnett’s Asymmetrical Warfare could be regarded as a bible
for those interested in exploring the implications of such a thesis. Like proponents of arguments advanced in the
early 1980s, Barnett, professor emeritus
at the Naval War College, believes that
the United States has never been more
vulnerable and must take drastic steps
to avert an impending catastrophe. Today’s security environment, aptly and
eloquently described in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States of America, is
characterized by undeterred rogue
states and transnational terrorist organizations with access to new weapons
that can inflict mass casualties on an
unprecedented scale. Barnett argues
that the new environment represents a
fundamental departure, or paradigm
shift, in that there are no longer any
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behavioral constraints on those seeking
to attack the United States. In short, the
international order stands at the precipice, if it has not already descended into
the Hobbesian state of nature.
Barnett argues that a series of mutually
supporting, and damaging, constraints—
moral, political, organizational, legal,
and operational—developed over the
second half of the twentieth century
and are now conspiring to subvert the
ability of the United States to use force
as a tool to manage the new security environment. He argues that the United
States is fundamentally in a strategically
defensive posture, thereby ceding the
initiative to its adversaries and making
it vulnerable to the kinds of surprise attacks that happened on 9/11. This
means that “the United States has,
without malice and forethought, backed
unwittingly into the situation where it
resembles the mighty Gulliver, cinched
down by Lilliputian strings.”
Barnett believes that these limitations
on using force have effectively created a
“breeding ground” for asymmetrical actions by adversaries under no moral or
political limits, who in fact perceive
these constraints as signs of weakness.
Throughout the history of warfare, participants have always sought to exploit
an opponent’s weaknesses, but Barnett
posits that asymmetric warfare today
constitutes something new and different—war and conflict without limits. In
other words, we are not talking about
adversaries advancing creative ideas on
asymmetric warfare like those developed during the 1930s by the Billy
Mitchells and Heinz Guderians of the
world, which eventually revolutionized conventional military warfare.
Today’s adversaries are bent on mass
destruction using any means at their
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disposal—nuclear, chemical, biological,
and cyberspace.
Barnett’s description of the international environment seems apt enough,
if a bit dire, and his discussion of the
various constraints is interesting and
contains some good and useful points.
He is right to point out that moral and
legal constraints have assumed great
importance in the conduct of military
operations. Such issues as collateral
damage, the idea of proportionality in
using force, and the perpetration of the
myth that the American people have an
aversion to taking casualties have all affected the decision-making process on
when and if the country should use
force. As for the country’s decision
making on using force, Barnett rightly
criticizes the haphazard series of interactions between various governmental
bureaucracies and the executive and
legislative branches as a discombobulated process that can be manipulated
and exploited by sophisticated adversaries. He is also right to point out that
the United Nations has proven to be
only marginally successful in managing
new threats to security in the international environment and that the successive surrendering of authority to the
international body under various treaties has constrained some capabilities
that could conceivably be useful for deterrence and operational use. Barnett’s
prescription to address the problem is
useful, suggesting that the United States
undertake a systematic review of circumstances under which the nation will
use force and be prepared to declare
war, and make these circumstances
widely known to its adversaries.
However, like those who declared that
the sky was falling in the 1980s, one
cannot help feeling that Barnett has
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overdramatized the situation. While the
9/11 attacks created a cottage industry
of sorts describing a supposedly new
and dangerous security environment,
the toppling of the World Trade Center
towers needs to be seen in the context
of a pattern of increasingly bold attacks
on the United States that arguably
stretch back to the 1980s, when the first
hostages were taken in Lebanon. One of
the surprising things about the attacks
was that they were a surprise at all. After all, Ramzi Youssef came closer than
is generally appreciated to bringing
down the towers in 1995; the Khobar
Towers attack in 1996 resulted in a dramatic change in U.S. security posture in
the Persian Gulf; and the United States
had already returned fire with al-Qa‘ida
following the August 1988 embassy attacks. Over this twenty-odd-year period,
America adjusted and took a variety of
steps, mostly at the operational and organizational levels, that helped create
the special operations capabilities that
are now being deployed around the
world in the so-called global war on
terrorism. Homeland defense is now a
priority, seeing the creation of a new
cabinet secretary and department to coordinate efforts at the federal, state, and
local levels.
While Barnett decries the irrelevance of
the United Nations in the new environment, the global war on terror is in fact
taking place within an internationally
sanctioned legal framework that requires all states to take necessary steps
to combat terrorism, including the use
of force. While the United Nations has
proven less successful in addressing
threats posed by rogue states, UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (passed
after 9/11) provides a useful and interesting template that requires global
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cooperation against the very threat
Barnett argues is a principal source of
evil in the international system. It is
hard to see that it is anything other
than a useful tool for marshaling a
global cooperative effort against
terrorism.
Moreover, while it is true that the
United States operates under a number
of constraints when using force, today’s
global military deployments around the
world simply belie Barnett’s contention
that the United States remains hamstrung in using force as a tool to manage the international environment. If
anything, it would appear that efforts
over the last twenty years have positioned America quite well to go after its
adversaries in all four corners of the
globe, and that the attacks of 9/11 created the political environment for decision makers to use force aggressively to
address perceived threats. While
Barnett asserts the necessity of a more
systematic and commonsensical process
for deciding when to use force, events
indicate that we are not doing too badly
on that front. As for a new declaratory
policy spelling out when the country
will use force, any adversary could read
the Bush administration’s national security strategy report and get a good
idea of the nation’s intolerance for directly threatening the United States.
On a stylistic note, Asymmetrical Warfare
at times reads like a legal brief, and it
gives the impression that the author simply searched for arguments supporting
his thesis and consciously ignored any
contradictory evidence or points of view.
Some parts of the text simply consist of a
series of long, strung-together quotes
by other authors, making for heavy
going. The extent to which the author
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repeats his arguments in successive
chapters is also somewhat irritating.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the
book provides an extremely interesting
and thought-provoking argument that is
cogently expressed in a well organized
work. Barnett has produced a useful
and positive contribution to the ongoing revitalization of the field of strategy
and to the associated debate surrounding the use of force in the international
environment. Students and professors
interested in security strategy in the
new century should add this work to
their libraries.
JAMES A. RUSSELL

Naval Postgraduate School

Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. $34.95

This well researched and clearly written
study of U.S. combat with Libya in the
1980s has important echoes for today’s
policy makers. It begins with a quick
look at America’s first war with a Muslim state—in the nineteenth century,
when the U.S. Navy fought viciously
with the Barbary pirates off the coast of
North Africa. It then traces the rise of
one of the Barbary pirates’ direct
descendants—the well known latetwentieth-century practitioner of state
terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of
Libya. Throughout the book Joseph
Stanik, professor of history and retired
naval officer, provides detailed accounts
of the 1980 key attacks and a well reasoned analysis of their political impact.
There is, of course, particularly well
documented material covering the
key air strike of 15 April 1986, which
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was a devastating blow against
Qaddafi’s regime and changed his approach profoundly.
For those of us on active service in the
1980s, the battles with Libya seemed a
bit of a sideshow when compared to the
main dance of the Cold War. Yet this
relatively short, bitter conflict was actually a harbinger of things to come.
Much as today’s terrorists seek to influence global events through individual
attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the
course of world activity through
bombings and state-sponsored terrorism. The Reagan administration at
first responded with rhetoric, but it
eventually became clear that more
forceful action would be needed.
It is interesting, in this time of “global
war on terrorism,” to look back to the
1980s and realize that this is a war that
began long before 9/11. President Reagan
was elected in no small measure in response to the state-condoned terrorism
of Iran, where radical students had held
American diplomats hostage for 444
days before Reagan’s election, releasing
them just after his inauguration. Over
the next five years, a series of dramatic
terrorist incidents followed—bombings
and killings in Lebanon, including the
horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over
two hundred Marines in a single moment; the murder of Marine embassy
guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of
major airliners and the killing of hostages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL,
Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome
and Vienna; and the dramatic disco
bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United
States had to respond, so in the spring
of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON
sent a clear and dramatic message to
Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.
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